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there has been no related growth 
in specific scholarly knowledge 
about those sites of conflict. The 
knowledge of Arabic, Urdu or Pa-
shto remains at extremely low 
levels in official corridors. There 
is, one can surmise simply from 
reading the back and forth sway 
of military and political policy in 
Afghanistan, very little advance-
ment in understanding of either 
the text or context of that nation. 
In America’s imperial theatre, 
Stewart and Mortenson exemplify a 
singular notion of “expert”. We can 
build, based on the profiles of oth-
er specimens – Robert D Kaplan, 
Fareed Zakaria, Robert Kagan – a 
picture of what the ideal type looks 
like from the official point of view. 
Such an “expert” is usually one who 
has not studied the region, and es-
pecially not in any academic capac-
ity. As a result, they do not possess 
any significant knowledge of its 
languages, histories or cultures. 
They are often vetted by the market, 
having produced a bestselling book 
or secured a job as a journalist with 
a major newspaper. They are not 
necessarily tied to the “official” nar-
ratives or understandings, and can 
even be portrayed as being “a critic” 
of the official policy. In other words, 
this profile fits one who doesn’t 
know enough. 
At the same time there are greater 
claims, and greater efforts, to-
wards satellite cameras and lis-
tening devices; drones which can 
hover for days; databases which 
can track all good Taliban and all 
bad Taliban. Yet who can decipher 
this data? When one considers the 
rise of “experts” such as Stewart 
or Mortenson against the growth 
of digitised data which remains 
elusive and overwhelming, one 
is left with a rather stark observa-
tion – that the American war ef-
fort prefers its human knowledge 
 circumspect or circumscribed and 
its technical knowledge crudely 
 totalised. 
!!!
It wasn’t always this way. In 1879, 
when the US Congress created 
the United States Geological 
Survey to chart and measure the 
American West, it simultaneously 
 established the Bureau of Ameri-
can Ethnology. Funded directly 
by the Congress, this body was 
chartered to record the languages, 
habitations, folk-tales and oral his-
tories of Native American tribes. 
It ought to be noted that these ef-
forts to “know” occurred in direct 
relationship with the opening up 
of the American West to Eastern 
capital, labour and settlement.
The decade following the Sec-
ond World War saw the creation of 
Area Studies departments across 
universities in America. These had 
an explicit charter to study those 
countries and regions which had 
remained “hidden” from Ameri-
can purview, but which were now 
considered the frontline in the 
emerging Cold War: China, India, 
Japan, the Middle East. Whether 
they were funded by the Depart-
ment of State or Defense, or via 
external, “independent” sources 
such as the Social Sciences Re-
search Council, the Ford Founda-
tion or the Carnegie Mellon Foun-
dation, conferences and publica-
tions were established to serve the 
interests of the American state. 
These developments saw the rise 
of the “Kremlinologist” and the 
“East Asianist”, both within and 
outside the Academy. 
If there was ever a situation in 
which linguistic, cultural and his-
torical expertise were privileged 
in American foreign policy, then 
the period between the Vietnam 
War and the end of the Cold War 
fundamentally altered it. The 
academy grew critical of American 
foreign policy and tried to distance 
itself. At the same time, the activi-
ties of US academics became the 
subject of official scrutiny. Vari-
ous scholars were investigated by 
the House Un-American Activities 
Committee for secret communist 
sympathies or for having “gone 
native”. The realignment of 
 expertise under Kissinger and, 
later, the Clinton Administration, 
eliminated those career foreign 
services officers who had lifelong 
attachments to the regions they 
covered. The rise of postcolonial 
and post-structuralist critiques of 
the relationship between power 
and knowledge further complicat-
ed the terrain.
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“I am sitting you next to Secretary 
Clinton at dinner. Say exactly what 
you think. If you don’t, I never – 
ever – want to hear you criticise 
the policy again.” So said Richard 
Holbrooke, the US Special Rep-
resentative to the Af-Pak region, 
barely a week after assuming his 
new position under the Obama 
administration. He was talking to 
Rory Stewart, and Stewart told the 
anecdote on the Huffington Post 
after Holbrooke’s sudden death 
in 2010. 
Holbrooke, Stewart remem-
bered, praised his acumen regard-
ing Afghanistan, and listened to 
him, even though Stewart disap-
proved of the emerging policy of 
General Petraeus. To Holbrooke, 
Stewart was the expert who dared 
disagree, but whose disagree-
ment still needed to be heard in 
the halls of power. 
Stewart is widely considered an 
expert on Afghanistan. Currently a 
Member of Parliament in Britain, 
he sits on the influential Foreign 
Affairs Select Committee. Previ-
ously, he was the Ryan Family Pro-
fessor of the Practice of Human 
Rights at the Harvard Kennedy 
School. Before that, in 2003-04, he 
worked in southern Iraq with the 
American administration. And pri-
or to that, in 2002, he walked 6,000 
miles – partly across Afghanistan. 
This last bit, his walk in Afghani-
stan, became the fulcrum of his 
2004 book, The Places in Between, 
which was a bestseller in the UK 
and the USA. The website for his 
book declared that he survived his 
walk because of “his knowledge of 
Persian dialects and Muslim cus-
toms” and a grounded knowledge 
of the entire region. 
Now, as an elected politician, 
Stewart has moved out of that neb-
ulous region of policy experts into 
policy-makers, but his credentials 
in the field continue to dominate 
his public persona. A sure sign of 
his biographical and political heft 
was Ian Parker’s recent profile 
in The New Yorker which frankly 
 assessed his chances of becoming 
prime minister.
Parker notes that Stewart “speaks 
some Dari and no Pashto” and had 
only limited exposure to the coun-
try, having lived, on and off, in 
 Kabul. Yet the very fact of his “walk-
ing” had transformed a  recent col-
lege graduate with fantasies of be-
coming the next TE Lawrence (who 
tried to engineer the birth of a new 
Arabia during the First World War) 
or Wilfred Thesiger (who walked 
over the Empty Quarter of Arabia 
and became known for his sparse 
travelogues of the Middle East) 
into the “real thing”. Unlike his 
heroes, however, Stewart’s main 
competence was not in navigat-
ing the desert but knowing DC. He 
isn’t the only person who has man-
aged to merge a personal narrative 
implying site-specific knowledge, 
avowedly ethnographic in nature, 
with a deep engagement with the 
political and analytical clusters of 
the American and British military.
In July 2010, The New York Times 
reported on the popularity of Greg 
Mortenson’s 2006 memoir Three 
Cups of Tea: One Man’s Mission to 
Promote Peace … One Man’s Mis-
sion to Fight Terrorism and Build 
Nations … One School at a Time 
among the US Military high-com-
mand. The report described Gen-
eral McChrystal and Admiral Mc-
Mullen using the text as a guide to 
their civilian strategy in Pakistan. 
Mortenson’s book quickly became 
required reading in military acad-
emies (the report hinted at the role 
played by the wives of senior mili-
tary brass in promoting the title) 
and Mortenson has since spoken 
to the US Congress and testified in 
front of committees. Mortenson 
himself, though a selfless worker 
for the most disenfranchised of 
Pakistan’s northwestern citizens, 
possesses no deep knowledge of 
the region’s past or present and 
is avowedly “non-political” in his 
local role. Still, his personal story, 
his experiences and the work of his 
charity are now widely considered 
to be a blueprint for US strategy in 
the Af-Pak region. 
Both Stewart and Mortenson 
 illustrate one particular configu-
ration of the relationship between 
knowledge and the American em-
pire – the “non-expert” insider who 
can traverse that unknown terrain 
and, hence, become an “expert”. 
Even a cursory examination of 
the archive dealing with the Amer-
ican efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan 
and Pakistan demonstrates that 
Flying 
blind
American spy technologies gather intelligence in vast 
quantities, yet US foreign policy is rife with unqualified 
pseudo-experts. To know or not to know? This is the  
great conundrum of empire, writes Manan Ahmed
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This widening gulf between the 
corridors of power and the halls of 
academia came with the unintend-
ed consequence that, barring a few 
notable exceptions, any knowl-
edgeable critique of American 
foreign policy gradually vanished. 
It is this vacuum that is filled by 
Stewart and Mortenson, who com-
bine accessibility with a whiff of 
“on-the-ground” expertise. A very 
similar role is played, in a popu-
lar culture hungry for “authentic” 
voices from the conflicted sites, by 
the fictions of Khaled Hosseini or 
Daniyal Mueenuddin.
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Yet these pundits are only part 
of the story. The more troubling 
 aspect is the change from human 
expertise to technical knowledge. 
The Washington Post noted recent-
ly that the US Air Force is rolling 
out a satellite-based observation 
technology called “Gorgon Stare”. 
A triumphalist quote described 
the programme thus: “Gorgon 
Stare will be looking at a whole 
city, so there will be no way for the 
adversary to know what we’re look-
ing at, and we can see everything.” 
This “everything” dominates 
m o s t  t e c h - b a s e d  s t r a t e g i e s 
which are regularly puffed in the 
 media. Some mention databases 
of tribal affiliations and sympa-
thies down to each inhabitant of 
a given street, neighbourhood, 
city and district. This database is 
then placed at the fingertips of US 
military personnel via their hand-
held electronic devices, letting 
them bring up the dossier on each 
 Afghan they encounter. 
This peculiar urge to know and 
then unknow remains a central 
conundrum for all empires. A very 
similar teleology is visible in the 
history of the British Empire in In-
dia. The earlier colonisations were 
accompanied by a bevy of East 
India Company employees who 
assiduously studied languages, 
learnt the local customs and be-
came – to use the term popular-
ised by writer William Dalrymple 
– “White Mughals”. That is, they 
“went native”. But just as the colo-
nial efforts to map and know India 
picked up steam – in the 1830s and 
1840s – the company administra-
tion began to raise concerns that 
British officers were losing their 
loyalty to their own country.
Lord Ellenborough, who led the 
British invasion of Afghanistan, 
was famously sceptical of British 
officers such as Richard F Burton 
or James Outram, who were re-
garded with suspicion for being 
too good with languages, travel-
ling in disguise among the natives. 
Before he became a renowned 
traveller and Orientalist, Burton 
served in Karachi and wrote the 
following regarding the conduct 
of his fellow officers: “The white 
man lives a life so distinct from the 
black, that hundreds of the former 
serve through what they call their 
‘terms of exile,’ without once  being 
present at a circumcision feast, a 
wedding, or a funeral”.
The “mutiny” of 1857 fully 
cleaved this ruling elite from the 
ruled masses – as the British colo-
niser retreated from civic space, 
creating segregated communi-
ties, thoroughfares, and estab-
lishments. Linked to this with-
drawal, however, was the most 
extensive and descriptive effort 
to count, catalogue and tabulate 
the vast populations of India. The 
1870s and 1880s were, as in the 
case of the American West, dec-
ades of prodigious ethnographic 
output where geographies of 
caste,  lineage, tribe, language, 
 settlements were carefully and 
explicitly mapped through survey 
teams headed by colonial admin-
istrators and staffed by legions 
of local knowledge brokers. By 
the turn of the century, however, 
British high  imperialism once 
again changed the character of 
knowledge  gathering and the re-
lationship of colonial power to the 
 Indian  landscape. The description 
gave way to the table.
One particularly pertinent exam-
ple of this process is the geographi-
cal surveys and census of the North 
West Frontier Provinces. First con-
ducted in 1904, and again, in 1910, 
they produced reams of maps, 
alongside came the Gazettes, which 
gathered lore, history, ethnogra-
phies. By 1930, this had progressed 
to the creation of databases – or 
Registers, as they were then called – 
on individual people. 
In a register produced in Decem-
ber 1930, to give one quick exam-
ple, titled – “List of leading Mullas 
on the border of the North West 
Frontier Province” – the follow-
ing categories of information are 
listed: “Name”, “Parentage”, “Year 
of birth”, “Caste or sect”, “Resi-
dence”, “Whether influential. If 
so with which tribes or sections”, 
“Attitude towards Government 
as far as known”, and “Remarks”. 
Remarkably close in conception 
and execution to the databases 
maintained by the United States in 
Afghanistan, this Register shows 
the progression from the ethno-
graphic narrative to the data ta-
ble, as the instrumentalisation of 
 political and colonial power began 
to converge explicitly into a brute-
force stratagem. 
Whether by the use of anthropolo-
gists and social scientists in the Hu-
man Terrain System or the reliance 
on the ethnographic “expert”, the 
American empire has often held 
the British example as a template 
(most likely at the behest of other 
scholar-combatants like Niall Fer-
guson or Bernard Lewis). Implicit 
in their critique, as in that of Rory 
Stewart, is the express desire that 
America must do a better job at 
 being an empire.
Even superficially this is, of 
course, a categorically illogical 
thing to assert. There is no better 
way to do empire. The condition of 
asserting political and military will 
over a distant population is one that 
cannot sustain itself in any mod-
ern, liberal society. The efforts to 
understand, will inevitably lead to 
the understanding that the people 
of Afghanistan or Pakistan or Iraq 
desire the power to make their own 
decisions – without the imposition 
of governments or militaries sanc-
tioned and placed from afar. 
The knowledge of languages and 
expertise will inevitably expose the 
lie that there is widespread sup-
port for unilateral military escala-
tions. The hope of a civilisational 
mission (which sustained the likes 
of Lawrence or Burton in their cri-
tiques of the failure of the British 
to do empire better) does still glim-
mer in some eyes – those of Fouad 
Ajami or Thomas Friedman, or 
George W Bush. 
This hope, being irrational and 
racist, actually requires blindness 
to the immediate and the real. No-
tice simply the befuddled faces of 
area experts when confronted by 
Tahrir Square. Notice simply that 
it isn’t the masses in the street that 
confound but the lack of explicit 
violence from the masses and the 
lack of religiosity of the masses. 
The appeal of the drone’s eye is 
precisely that it does not see every-
thing, because it carries no under-
standing of the things it records. 
The experts who are required to 
imagine Afghanistan or Pakistan 
traverse those spaces in a manner 
similar to the drones, on their own 
preprogrammed missions where 
every little thing becomes a target 
on which to pin their policies.
Manan Ahmed is a historian of  
Pakistan at Freie Universitat Berlin. 
He blogs at Chapati Mystery. 
Yet these pundits are only part of the story. 
The more troubling  aspect is the change from 
human expertise to technical knowledge.
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